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Abstract
Background: In this study we examined the influence of type of insurance and the influence of
managed care in particular, on the length of stay decisions physicians make and on variation in
medical practice.
Methods: We studied lengths of stay for comparable patients who are insured under managed or
non-managed care plans. Seven Diagnosis Related Groups were chosen, two medical (COPD and
CHF), one surgical (hip replacement) and four obstetrical (hysterectomy with and without
complications and Cesarean section with and without complications). The 1999, 2000 and 2001 –
data from hospitals in New York State were used and analyzed with multilevel analysis.
Results: Average length of stay does not differ between managed and non-managed care patients.
Less variation was found for managed care patients. In both groups, the variation was smaller for
DRGs that are easy to standardize than for other DRGs.
Conclusion: Type of insurance does not affect length of stay. An explanation might be that
hospitals have a general policy concerning length of stay, independent of the type of insurance of
the patient.
Background
There is concern that factors other than the medical needs
of a patient influence decision-making by physicians
[1,2]. Non-medical factors play a role in explaining med-
ical practice variation [3-5]. Among the factors that influ-
ence medical treatment are uncertainty of the most
effective practice, response to regulations, method of
patients' payment to the physicians, and type of insurance
coverage [4].
In this study we examined the influence of type of insur-
ance, and the influence of managed care in particular, on
the decisions physicians take and on variation in medical
practice. Managed care plans have evolved in the USA,
where they are widely used to control costs by combining
the financing and delivery of health care. Providers are at
financial risk in capitated plans and the insured have less
choice where treatment and health care providers are con-
cerned. The potential of managed care is attractive to pol-
icy makers in Europe.
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Different types of insurance coverage are linked to differ-
ent premiums and different ways in which providers of
care are paid. As a consequence, the type of insurance
cover that patients have might influence the treatment
given to patients. In traditional insurance plans, providers
are paid fee-for-service. The insured can choose the physi-
cians they want and consult them whenever they want,
resulting in maximum freedom for both the insured and
the provider. These plans were fully unmanaged in the
past, but even these plans use managed care to some
extent, nowadays [6].
The HMO is the best known type of managed care in the
US [1]. HMO insured are obliged to choose a primary care
physician, and treatment by specialists is only compen-
sated after referral by the primary care physician. Physi-
cians within the HMO network are often at financial risk;
they are capitated or face a risk-sharing withdrawal [7-14].
It should be emphasized that the terms managed and
non-managed care were developed decades ago, when
Health Maintenance Organizations were well defined
organizations that used specific techniques to manage
hospital utilization. These definitions have become less
clear, however, particularly during the last few years. Man-
aged care organizations have adopted more features of tra-
ditional health plans, such as the ability of patients to
access specialty physicians directly, while at the same
time, traditional insurance plans have made greater use of
utilization controls once practiced largely by health main-
tenance organizations.
Managed care insurers use various utilization manage-
ment strategies to reduce health care costs, primarily by
avoiding unnecessary hospital admissions. This is done by
using the primary care physician as a gatekeeper, reducing
length of stay and negotiating reduced payments to pro-
viders for services [11,15,16]. Moreover, preauthorization
for specialty care is required [12]. Restrictions on the treat-
ment a physician can provide are greatest in fully man-
aged delivery systems. Concurrent treatment and
retrospective utilization review are common [6].
The performance of physicians is judged on length of stay,
among other things. This makes length of stay a valuable
outcome variable, although lengths of stay in the USA are
already shorter than in Europe.
Different types of insurance provide different constraints
and incentives that influence the length of stay decision.
Using ordinary regression analysis, it was found that the
way patients are insured [17,18] and physicians are paid
[19] significantly influences length of stay. A review car-
ried out by Miller and Luft [20] reported that length of
stay was shorter for patients in Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs; a managed care organization), in
fifteen out of sixteen observations from thirteen studies
using data from 1980 onwards. Our study is different
from these studies, as a result of our methodology and the
focus on managed and non-managed care alone. HMOs
(managed care) will be compared to traditional plans
(non-managed care).
The question we seek to answer is the following:
Do physicians choose different lengths of stay for comparable
patients who are differently insured (managed/non-managed)?
Hypotheses
HMOs try to control hospital costs, which means they
have to influence a variety of decisions made by the
insured and their physicians. It is most effective to prevent
the insured from being admitted to the hospital, but once
in hospital, length of stay should be influenced. In this
study, we focus on this influence on length of stay.
Physicians decide on treatment strategies and timing of
discharge, thereby determining the length of stay. On the
other hand, physicians are confronted with constraints
that influence their decisions. Our assumption is that var-
iation between the decisions made by physicians is related
to systematic differences in the constraints they face. In
this study, we focus on one important set of constraints,
viz. those set by the insurer of the patients.
Constraints for the HMO insured will be far more restric-
tive than for the traditionally insured, implying that vari-
ation between physicians treating patients with an HMO
insurance will be less than the variation between physi-
cians treating other patients. Physicians treating patients
with an HMO insurance face similar constraints and
incentives, leading to similar length of stay decisions.
Inpatient days are very expensive for insurers, who will
therefore try to limit these expenses, by using incentives
for physicians to discharge patients as soon as possible.
Physicians sometimes receive a bonus from the HMO-
insurer for example, if they reach a certain utilization tar-
get and physicians will try to earn this bonus in order to
increase their income.
On the basis of the differences in constraints between
managed and non-managed care plans, we hypothesize
that:
1) length of stay will be shorter for managed care patients
2) there will be less variation in length of stay for managed care
patientsBMC Health Services Research 2004, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/4/3
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Physicians decide on treatment strategies and timing of
discharge, thereby determining length of stay. Neither the
hospital nor the insurer signs the discharge note, and hos-
pital and insurer can only try to influence that decision.
Physicians deal with different insurers within one hospi-
tal, and variation within a hospital is therefore to be
expected.
3) The influence of managed care, i.e. less variation in length
of stay, will primarily be found at physician level
Apart from the difference between managed care and non-
managed care in the substance of the constraints they
apply to physicians, the restrictiveness of the constraints
may vary with market conditions. Physicians can be
induced to follow rules set by the insurer if the physicians
are dependent on the insurer. In the case of managed care
plans, physicians have a contract and this offers opportu-
nities for influencing behavior.
Managed care plans set rules for hospitals and physicians
to follow and the importance of following those rules will
be higher when a physician has a lot of managed care
patients. The physician will avoid losing these patients by
following the rules as best as possible.
4) The higher the proportion of managed care patients the phy-
sician has, the shorter the length of stay and the less the varia-
tion in length of stay at physician level
The same applies to hospitals. When there are a lot of
managed care patients, a hospital will try to influence the
decision physicians make, and thus to ensure the criteria
are met.
5) The higher the proportion of managed care patients the hos-
pital has, the shorter the length of stay and the less the variation
at hospital level
The effectiveness of an insurer in influencing physicians is
conditional to the dependency of the physicians on that
insurer. If a physician deals with one insurer, it will be
possible for that insurer to control that physician's behav-
ior. If the physician has an alternative, an insurer will have
less power over medical decisions.
6) Physicians who deal with fewer insurers will have less vari-
ation in length of stay for managed care patients
Again, the same applies to hospitals. Hospitals dealing
with fewer insurers will be more dependent on these
insurers and will therefore be more easily controlled.
These hospitals will try to be more effective in controlling
the physicians practicing in the hospital, in order to keep
the insurer satisfied. Stringent credentialing and utiliza-
tion reviews will be carried out [22].
7) Hospitals dealing with fewer insurers will experience less
variation in length of stay for managed care patients
There are interdependencies between hospitals and physi-
cians. Hospitals need good physicians to attract patients,
physicians need hospitals to care for their patients and to
provide equipment. Whether one is able to influence the
behavior of the other in cases of divergent incentives,
depends on the existence of an alternative. The impor-
tance of the relationship between physicians and hospi-
tals will be greater when physicians practice in fewer
different hospitals [21]. Physicians will be more depend-
ent, and are thus more easily controlled when they prac-
tice in fewer hospitals. As a consequence, physicians will
show less variation in their length of stay choice when
they work in fewer different hospitals.
8) Physicians practicing in fewer different hospitals will have
less variation in length of stay for managed care patients
Insurers pay hospitals on a DRG basis and DRGs consist
of conditions requiring similar lengths of stay in the hos-
pital [22]. Rules on length of stay made by insurers will
not be as restrictive for all DRGs and there will probably
be a difference between those DRGs that are easy to stand-
ardize and those that are not. Surgical DRGs, for example,
can be more easily standardized than medical DRGs like
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD).
9) The easier it is to standardize treatment for a specific DRG,
the less variation in length of stay there will be for patients
under managed care
Methods
Description of the data
Data were obtained from the New York Statewide Plan-
ning and Research Cooperative System (SPARCS), which
is a comprehensive patient data system established as a
result of cooperation between the health care industry and
government. SPARCS is a major management tool assist-
ing hospitals, agencies, and health care organizations with
decision-making regarding financial planning and moni-
toring of inpatient and ambulatory surgery services and
costs in New York State. It is important to recognize the
fact that there are huge inter-state differences in insurance
programs. Medicaid in one state, for instance, is different
to Medicaid in another state.
Managed care penetration in New York State is below the
average for the USA; an average of ten percent of inpatient
contacts is under a managed care program. There are 62
counties (58 in the analysis) and insurance plans differBMC Health Services Research 2004, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/4/3
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per county. The number of physicians per 10,000 civilian
population in New York State is 35.3, which is higher than
the US average of 25.5 (1995 data, [23]).
We used 1999, 2000 and 2001 SPARCS-data and seven
DRGs were studied: two medical (DRGs 88 and 127:
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease and Congestive
Heart Failure), one surgical (DRG 209: hip replacement)
and four obstetrical (DRGs 358, 359, 370 and 371: hyster-
ectomy with and without complications, cesarean section
with and without complications). Cases for which no
physician was known were omitted (1.3 percent of all
cases) and only patients above the age of twenty were
included. Patients with extremely long stays (defined as
the average length of stay plus 1.96 times the standard
deviation) were excluded, which involved a minimum of
0.86% and a maximum of 3.72% of cases per procedure.
The study populations for all three years are summarized
in Table 1.
Analyses
Each DRG was analyzed separately, with three groups of
patients being created within each DRG: one for managed
care (HMO, Medicaid HMO and Medicare HMO), one for
non-managed care (Blue Cross/Blue Shield, commercial
insurance, Medicaid, Medicare) and a group containing
all patients not insured or otherwise insured. Mean age for
the managed care patients is 47.9 years, for the non-man-
aged care patients 61.1 years, and for all other patients
49.5 years. The percentages of managed care patients for
each DRG are fourteen for COPD, fourteen for CHF,
twenty-one for total hip, thirty-eight for hysterectomy
with complications, thirty-eight for hysterectomy without
complications and thirty-seven and forty for Cesarean sec-
tion with and without complications respectively.
Multi-level analysis was used to examine the differences in
length of stay between the managed and the non-man-
aged care groups, thus acknowledging the fact that
patients are hierarchically nested within physicians and
physicians within hospitals [24]. We controlled for age,
sex, race and co-morbidities. Characteristics of the physi-
cian included in the analysis were the proportion of
patients insured under a managed care system (range 0–
1), the number of hospitals in which the physician prac-
tices (range 1–7) and the number of insurers (range 1–10)
that was dealt with. Hospital characteristics that were
included were the proportion of patients insured under a
managed care system (range 0–0.6) and the number of
insurers (range 1–12). All variables are centered. Further-
more, we controlled for differences in insurance programs
between counties by adding county as a level to our
model. The model consists of four levels, viz. the level of
the patient, the physician, the hospital and the (hospital)
county. Separate models were fit for each year. Table 2
shows how the different hypotheses were tested. The vari-
ance is used as a measure of variation.
Results
Table 3 shows the mean length of stay for the managed
and the non-managed care groups for each DRG. Length
of stay for the managed care group is slightly shorter in
two out of seven cases. The differences are very small,
however, being even less than the half-day that is the min-
imum to save costs. The hypothesis (1) is not confirmed.
Table 4 shows the variation in length of stay for the man-
aged and non-managed care groups for each DRG. The
variation within the managed care group is significantly
smaller for five out of seven DRGs, which is consistent
with the hypothesis (2). Most of the variation between
managed and non-managed care groups can be found at
patient level.
Table 1: Study population: number of patients, physicians, hospitals and percentage of excluded cases per DRG 1999, 2000, 2001
DRG Diagnosis/ 
Procedure
number of 
discharges 
1999
2000 2001 number 
of 
physicians 
1999
2000 2001 number of 
hospitals 
1999
2000 2001 % cases 
excluded 
1999
2000 2001
88 Chronic Obstructive 
Pulmonary Disease
38,424 36,478 34,400 9,125 8,779 8,476 237 234 228 0.86 3.46 2.62
127 Congestive Heart 
Failure
62,682 62,599 59,763 11,282 11,285 11,048 233 234 229 3.21 3.72 3.00
209 Hip replacement 28,426 29,827 32,016 1,267 1,238 1,240 210 207 204 2.58 3.04 3.13
358 Hysterectomy with 
complications
8,408 8,412 8,137 2,236 2,154 2,104 215 208 207 1.87 3.41 3.58
359 Hysterectomy without 
complications
21,962 22,926 22,604 2,630 2,608 2,520 216 215 212 2.46 2.09 1.78
370 Cesarean section with 
complications
11,731 12,125 11,955 2,217 2,240 2,183 164 161 159 2.61 2.54 2.42
371 Cesarean section 
without complications
39,844 42,980 42,769 2,602 2,654 2,571 163 161 159 1.31 1.25 1.22BMC Health Services Research 2004, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/4/3
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The difference in the variation for the managed and non-
managed care groups at hospital level and at physician
level is measured as a ratio (the variation of the managed
care group divided by the variation of the non-managed
care group). The ratio is one if the variation for both
groups is the same, less than one if the variation of the
managed care group is smaller, and greater than one if the
variation of the managed care group is greater than the
variation of the non-managed care group. If the difference
in variation between the managed and the non-managed
care groups is insignificant, the ratio is set at 1. A differ-
ence in variation between the two groups is found only at
physician level for DRG 88, Chronic Obstructive Pulmo-
nary Disease, (1.43, p < 0.1), DRG 127, Congestive Heart
Failure, (0.71, p < 0.1), DRG 209, hip replacement, (0.73,
p < 0.05), and DRG 370, Cesarean section with complica-
tions, (3.44, p < 0.1). These results do not provide une-
quivocal evidence indicating that the variation within the
Table 2: Description of the hypothesis testing
Hypothesis Description Method of testing
1 shorter length of stay managed care mean length of stay for the managed care and the non-managed care group are 
compared
2 less variation length of stay managed care variation in length of stay for the managed care and the non-managed care group 
are compared
3 influence managed care at physician level the variation for the managed care group and the non-managed care group at 
physician level is compared to the variation for both groups at hospital level
4 shorter length of stay, less variation when 
more managed care patients per physician
the regression coefficient for the proportion of managed care patients per 
physicians is examined as well as the covariance between this proportion and the 
variation in length of stay; both are expected to be negative
5 shorter length of stay, less variation when 
more managed care patients per hospital
the regression coefficient for the proportion of managed care patients per hospital 
is examined as well as the covariance between this proportion and the variation in 
length of stay; both are expected to be negative.
6 fewer insurers per physician, less variation in 
length of stay
the covariance between the number of insurers per physician and the variation in 
length of stay is examined and expected to be positive.
7 fewer insurers per hospital, less variation in 
length of stay
the covariance between the number of insurers per hospital and the variation in 
length of stay is examined and expected to be positive.
8 fewer different hospitals per physician, less 
variation in length of stay
the covariance between the number of hospitals per physician and the variation in 
length of stay is examined and expected to be positive.
9 DRGs that can be standardized show less 
variation
variation for all DRGs is compared, most variation is expected in medical DRGs 
and DRGs with complications
Table 3: Mean length of stay (LOS) for managed and non-managed care groups for each DRG
DRG Diagnosis/ 
Procedure
mean LOS in 
days (s. error) 
managed care 
group 1999
2000 2001 mean LOS days 
(s. error) non-
managed care 
group 1999
2000 2001 difference between 
managed and non-
managed care 
groups (days) 1999
2000 2001
88 Chronic 
Obstructive 
Pulmonary 
Disease
3.92 (0.31) 3.93 (0.24) 3.47 (0.24) 3.77 (0.29) 3.79 (0.20) 3.35 (0.22) 0.15 0.14 0.12
127 Congestive 
Heart Failure
1.77 (0.25) 1.77 (0.25) 1.74 (0.25) 1.71 (0.22) 1.58 (0.23) 1.67 (0.22) 0.06 0.19 0.07
209 Hip 
replacement
5.21 (1.16) 4.35 (0.74) 5.02 (0.40) 5.25 (1.15) 4.62 (0.74) 5.01 (0.39) -0.04 -0.27 0.01
358 Hysterectomy 
with 
complications
3.08 (0.75) 1.93 (0.45) 2.06 (0.45) 3.18 (0.74) 1.92 (0.45) 2.10 (0.46) -0.10 0.01 -0.04
359 Hysterectomy 
without 
complications
2.38 (0.31) 2.35 (0.17) 2.68 (0.13) 2.42 (0.31) 2.28 (0.17) 2.71 (0.12) -0.04 0.07 -0.03
370 Cesarean 
section with 
complications
2.95 (0.14) 2.40 (0.80) 1.89 (1.76) 2.82 (0.13) 2.37 (0.80) 1.88 (1.77) 0.13 0.03 0.01
371 Cesarean 
section without 
complications
2.88 (0.30) 2.69 (0.21) 3.28 (0.22) 2.84 (0.30) 2.70 (0.21) 3.26 (0.21) 0.04 -0.01 0.02BMC Health Services Research 2004, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/4/3
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managed care group is smaller than the variation within
the non-managed care group at physician level, and the
hypothesis is not confirmed (3). There are no differences
between the variations for both groups at hospital level
for all DRGs.
Table 5 summarizes the regression coefficients and the
covariances for the different variables. All four significant
regression coefficients for the proportion of HMO
patients per physician show that the higher the propor-
tion of managed care patients that physicians have, the
shorter the length of stay. The covariance shows the rela-
tion between the proportion of managed care patients and
Table 4: Variation in length of stay for managed and non-managed care groups for each DRG
DRG Diagnosis/
 Procedure
variation
 managed
care group
 1999
2000 2001 variation
 non-
managed
care group
 1999
2000 2001 difference
 between
managed and
non-managed
 care groups
1999
2000 2001
88 Chronic
Obstructive
Pulmonary
Disease
14.4 9.52 9.27 17.1 10.5 10.9 -2.7** -0.98** -1.63**
127 Congestive
Heart Failure
11.9 11.2 11.2 14.1 13.0 13.8 -2.2** -1.80** -2.65**
209 Hip replacement 4.91 4.59 4.04 6.67 5.72 4.95 -1.8** -1.13** -0.91**
358 Hysterectomy
with 
complications
3.27 2.28 2.32 4.18 2.71 2.72 -0.9** -0.43** -0.40**
359 Hysterectomy
without 
complications
0.89 0.83 0.84 0.90 0.88 0.86 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02
370 Cesarean
section with
complications
3.38 2.93 3.39 3.84 3.61 3.55 -0.46* -0.68** -0.16
371 Cesarean
section
without
complications
0.80 0.77 0.74 0.83 0.82 0.81 -0.03 -0.05** -0.07**
*p < 0.05 ** p < 0.001
Table 5: Effects on length of stay; relevant regression coefficients (RC) and covariance with the managed care group (COV, whether 
this coefficient is positive or negative) for each variable per DRG.
DRG Diagnosis/ 
Procedure
HMO patients per 
physician
HMO patients per hospital number of 
insurers per 
physician
number of 
insurers per 
hospital
number of 
hospitals per 
physician
RC COV RC COV COV COV COV
88 Chronic Obstructive 
Pulmonary Disease
-0.22 pos 0.48 neg** pos neg pos*
127 Congestive Heart 
Failure
0.03 pos** 0.46 neg pos pos pos
209 Hip replacement -0.97** neg** -1.60** neg** pos** neg pos**
358 Hysterectomy with 
complications
-0.25** neg -0.25 pos pos* pos pos*
359 Hysterectomy 
without 
complications
-0.08 neg** 0.49* neg pos** pos pos
370 Cesarean section 
with complications
-0.29* pos* 0.78 pos* pos pos** neg**
371 Cesarean section 
without 
complications
-0.08** neg 0.59* pos pos** pos* neg
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05BMC Health Services Research 2004, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/4/3
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the variation in length of stay for managed care patients.
Two significant covariances have a negative sign, which
means that variation between physicians is lower when
the proportion of managed care patients is higher; two
other significant covariances show the opposite. The
hypothesis is not confirmed (4).
The significant regression coefficients for the proportion
of managed care patients per hospital show that length of
stay is higher when the proportion of managed care
patients is higher. Our hypothesis is not confirmed. The
significant covariances show opposite effects. The hypoth-
esis is not confirmed (5).
As expected, variation in length of stay is higher when the
number of insurers per physician is higher (hypothesis 6).
We found two significant covariances for the influence of
the number of insurers per hospital, indicating a higher
variation when the number of insurers is higher. This is
consistent with the hypothesis (7). Covariances for the
number of hospitals in which a physician practices show
that the variation in length of stay is higher for three DRGs
and is lower for another DRG when a physician practices
in more hospitals. The hypothesis (8) is not confirmed.
We compared variation for the seven DRGs to test the last
hypothesis (9) on whether variation in length of stay will
be less when treatment is easy to standardize. The compar-
ison shows (Table 4) that variation is smallest for DRGs
359 and 371, which are the obstetrical DRGs without
complications and are DRGs that can be standardized.
Variation is greatest in the medical DRGs (88 and 127),
which are less easy to standardize. This is true for both the
managed care patients and the non-managed care
patients. The hypothesis (9) is confirmed.
Conclusions and discussion
In this study, we found no difference in length of stay
between managed and non-managed care patients. Fur-
thermore, it appeared that there was less variation in
length of stay for managed care patients. All results are
summarized in Table 6. Contrary to our expectations, this
difference is not primarily found at physician level, nor is
it found at hospital level. It is found at patient level, how-
ever, which means that patients with managed care insur-
ance plans differ from patients with non-managed care
insurance plans. This implies the existence of some sort of
selection; patients insured under a managed care system
are more similar than other patients.
Selection by managed care insurance plans has been
found in some other studies, which conclude that the
managed care insured are younger and healthier
[20,25,26]. The mean age of the managed care patients in
this study is 47.9 years, while this is 61.1 years for the non-
managed care patients. Fourteen percent of the CHF-
patients are insured under a managed care plan, whereas
this applies to forty percent of the patients with a Cesarean
section. There is less variation for procedures that are easy
to standardize, such as those where no complications
occur, irrespective of the type of insurance.
The question that comes to the fore is how unmanaged is
non-managed care? New York State has lower managed
care penetration than the US-average and approximately
ten percent of patients are covered by a managed care pro-
gram, which suggests two possibilities. One is that utiliza-
tion controls for these plans are more aggressive and that
there are greater differences in utilization between them,
because managed care penetration is so low. This was
obviously not the case, however. A more plausible expla-
nation is that the need to compete and limit managed care
penetration has caused traditional insurance plans to
adopt many of the techniques used in managed care.
Yet another possibility, is that the management of care in
United States hospitals is increasingly provider-driven. In
this context, hospitals will apply utilization controls to all
payors to reduce expenses, rather than to individual
groups of patients. This point has a major application to
Table 6: Results of the hypothesis testing
Hypothesis Description Test result
1 shorter length of stay managed care not confirmed
2 less variation length of stay managed care confirmed
3 influence managed care at physician level not confirmed
4 shorter length of stay, less variation when more managed care patients per physician confirmed, not confirmed
5 shorter length of stay, less variation when more managed care patients per hospital not confirmed, not confirmed
6 fewer insurers per physician, less variation in length of stay confirmed
7 fewer insurers per hospital, less variation in length of stay confirmed
8 fewer different hospitals per physician, less variation in length of stay not confirmed
9 DRGs that can be standardized show less variation confirmedBMC Health Services Research 2004, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/4/3
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lengths of stay in New York State, where since 1986 all
payors have reimbursed hospitals on a per discharge basis,
rather than by the day. This means that hospitals have an
incentive to reduce expenses for all payors, rather than
simply those regarded as managed care plans.
Some hospitals employ case managers who do the dis-
charge planning for all patients in the hospital, using
benchmarks such as clinical pathways, criteria to deter-
mine necessity of admission or length of stay parameters.
A hospital may compare its length of stay to similar hos-
pitals in California, which generally have a shorter length
of stay for the same diagnosis. This case management does
not take into account whether a patient is under a man-
aged care or a non-managed care program. Where an
insurer is concerned, it can be highly effective to put pres-
sure on a hospital and to let the hospital, in its turn, put
pressure on the physicians. Length of stay or other
requirements can be included in contracts between
insurer and hospital, obliging the hospital to report to the
insurer on the clinical care rendered by physicians or oth-
ers. In order to avoid unnecessary utilization or losing a
contract, it can be worth the effort for the hospital to
employ case managers. Hospital norms can be communi-
cated to physicians, patients and others involved in care,
to ensure that hospital expectations regarding length of
stay can be met. If the hospitals set their length of stay
norm below that of all insurers and manage discharge
effectively, there will be no difference in length of stay
related to type of insurance. Since some insurers are more
effective in length of stay management than hospital case
management, some insurers will employ nurses in the
hospital to manage for them. In these cases, insurance-
related differences are possible.
In this study, there was a difference in the effect of the pro-
portion of managed care patients on the physicians and
on the hospitals. Where physicians are concerned, length
of stay is shorter when this proportion is higher, but this
effect was not found in hospitals. This means that physi-
cians' length of stay choice is influenced by the insurer,
while the hospital does not change its policy. The
proportion of managed care patients does not have an
unequivocal effect on the variation in both physicians and
hospitals, indicating that there is no insurer effect.
The hypothesis that there is more variation when physi-
cians practice in many hospitals is not confirmed. The
option of treating patients in another hospital does not
influence variation in length of stay for managed care
patients, which would seem to be an effect of the insurer
in combination with less variation when the number of
insurers is lower.
Contrary to our study, insurance and payment were found
to have a significant influence on length of stay in the
studies mentioned in the introduction [17,19,20], which
compared several types of insurance. Ordinary least
squares regression was used to measure effects on length
of stay, thus neglecting the fact that data are on different
levels of aggregation. Hospital characteristics were also
assigned to the patient level and when regression coeffi-
cients of hospital characteristics are assigned to the patient
level, the units of analysis are considered to be independ-
ent observations. Patients are hierarchically nested within
hospitals, however, and so the assumption of independ-
ent observations is not correct. As a consequence, different
levels of analysis should be taken into account by using
multi-level analysis [24]. Furthermore, it is important to
recognize the fact that there are considerable inter-state
differences between insurance programs with the same
name. Medicaid in one state is different to Medicaid in
another state for instance, and these must therefore be
considered as different programs, or analyses have to be
made for individual states.
Bradbury et al [18] compared a specific type of HMO with
traditional insurance programs by hospital, thus keeping
hospital characteristics constant. Due to the fact that there
had to be enough admissions of both types of insurance
to a hospital for ordinary regression analysis to be possi-
ble, only ten (of the initial 78) hospitals were included in
the analyses, a problem that could have been overcome
with multi-level analysis. Results showed that for this spe-
cific type of HMO (the independent practice association
or IPA), length of stay is shorter than for patients insured
under a traditional program. In addition to using a
different methodology that might lead to different out-
comes, all studies were carried out in the eighties and early
nineties. The potential impact of the evolution of tradi-
tional insurance plans to include managed care tech-
niques should not be discounted, and the terms
traditional insurance and managed care plans may have
become anachronisms in this context. This study may sug-
gest the need for a more sophisticated approach to the
subject, focusing on the impact of specific utilization
management techniques.
Managed care was introduced in the US to keep health
care costs from rising. Health care costs are also rising rap-
idly in Europe and a solution is being pursued as a conse-
quence. While limiting the supply side and setting
budgets were seen as solutions at first, there is a shift
towards managed care nowadays. Although health care
costs in the United States are the highest worldwide, the
health care system there serves as an example to European
countries as the introduction of managed care techniques
is examined [16,27,28].BMC Health Services Research 2004, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/4/3
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Policy makers believe that managed care reduces costs
without affecting the quality of health care. Nevertheless,
it is open to question whether a cost reduction that pro-
vides less care and involves shorter lengths of stay truly
does not affect the quality of care. Evidence of cost reduc-
tion is found in the short length of stay that is experienced
in the United States, although it remains unclear whether
this short length of stay is an effect of managed care or
possibly of something else in the system. Furthermore,
health care costs in the United States have continued to
rise, despite the increasing number of managed care
insured. This might be caused by the high costs that come
with managed care systems, such as the costs of monitor-
ing, or it may be due to increasing costs of medication,
supplies, and various treatments. Some medications and
treatments are still considered experimental, causing
research and development costs to increase. Additionally,
competing companies may develop similar drugs and
treatments, each vying for use. The increases in United
States health care costs could also be a pricing issue. In
order to survive, hospitals may be raising prices and
reducing expenses to order to keep up with payors [29]. It
is also easy to lose sight of some (negative) effects of man-
aged care that will come to the fore when elements from
the health care system in the United States are transferred
to European countries, since analyses of international
health care policy have demonstrated that elements from
one system cannot simply be transferred to a different sys-
tem [30,31].
Managed care fits into the role of sickness funds in Euro-
pean social health insurance systems. Dutch sickness
funds have a lot in common with HMOs for example;
there is a contract with providers, providers receive a
budget, a primary care physician is obligatory for the
insured and monitoring of providers is common [32].
Experiments with HMOs are taking place in Switzerland
[33,34] and there is interest in Germany in what is called
"Integrierte Versorgung", which is networks of health care
providers that receive a budget from sickness funds [32].
These can also be compared to HMOs.
In this study, we did not find evidence that it is managed
care that has an effect on length of stay and thus on costs
related to inpatient days. There seems to be something
else that is causing the short length of hospital stay in the
United States, independently of the patient's insurance.
What we found is that it is not restrictions imposed by the
insurer that result in patterns of variation, since there are
hardly any differences in length of stay of managed care
and non-managed care patients. It might be the case that
hospitals respond to the way they are paid; payment per
DRG means that it is always (cost) efficient to keep length
of stay short. Or it may be that the knowledge that man-
aged care is on the increase is causing hospitals to react in
advance by developing strategies to make sure that they
will have (managed care) patients in the future [35].
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